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SYMPTOMS OF NEGLECT: TRUST CLAIMS UNDER THE 
LIMITATION ACT 2010 
 
ABSTRACT 
New Zealand's limitation legislation was overhauled with the enacting of 
the Limitation Act 2010.  Despite this comprehensive reform, the way in 
which trust claims are best to be addressed appears to have been largely 
overlooked in the reform process.  Consequently, the multitude of historic 
issues that have plagued statutory provisions dealing with trust claims 
endure in the 2010 Act, with the few changes to the structure of drafting 
compounding these problems.  This paper explores the policy 
considerations at work, and, by way of example, undertakes a thorough 
analysis of the exception for fraudulent breaches of trust in light of these 
policy considerations to illustrate some of the new problems that are 
bound to arise in practice.  Given the numerous and significant 
difficulties, and the substantial implications for parties seeking to rely on 
these provisions, this paper argues that a broad reconsideration of the 
way in which trust claims are dealt with in the 2010 Act is urgently 
needed. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Early in 2014, issues surrounding the limitation of actions for breach of trust were 
once again thrust into the limelight with the United Kingdom Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria.1  This is the most recent of a number 
of cases in the senior courts across common law jurisdictions demonstrating the very 
real, significant and ongoing difficulties engendered by the way in which statutes of 
limitation deal with breaches of trust.2  This is a crucial area of law.  The 
                                                 
1 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] 2 WLR 355. 
2 Recent examples include Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 (CA); DEG-Deutsche v Koshy 
[2002] 1 BCLC 478; Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) [2003] EWCA Civ 
 4
repercussions for claimants, particularly in the commercial and family contexts, are 
significant.  This is well demonstrated by the £6 million at stake in the Williams case.  
In light of these difficulties and their implications, this paper considers the law 
relating to breaches of trust under New Zealand's Limitation Act 2010 (2010 Act).   
 
Despite the otherwise comprehensive overhaul of New Zealand's statutory 
limitation regime in 2010, issues relating to trusts appear to have been largely 
overlooked, such that historic issues endure and in some respects have been 
compounded by the drafting of the New Zealand legislation.  Focusing specifically, 
by way of example, on the treatment accorded to fraudulent breaches of trust, this 
paper analyses the way in which the 2010 Act deals with trust claims in light of the 
inherent policy tensions in all limitation statutes, and the particular policy 
considerations concerning the special relationship between trustee and beneficiary.  In 
doing so, it is identified that the relative neglect as to the way in which trust claims 
are to be affected by the 2010 Act presents serious problems that need to be addressed 
before the 2010 Act begins to have an undesirable effect in practice. 
 
The paper begins by describing the core reforms to limitation periods in the 2010 
Act, indicating that issues arising in respect of trust claims were overlooked.  It then 
turns to consider how claims in respect of trusts are dealt with under the 2010 Act and 
its predecessor, the Limitation Act 1950 (1950 Act), and the problems that arise.  Part 
IV then focuses on the specific example of the statutory exception to the ordinary six-
year limitation period for fraudulent breaches of trust.  It demonstrates, in light of the 
relevant policy considerations, how the drafting of the 2010 Act has created new 
complications for claimant beneficiaries seeking to rely on the exception.  Part V 
concludes by suggesting that it may be more appropriate to treat trust claims as a 
separate species of claim, rather than lumping such claims in with other civil claims, 
albeit while providing for specified exceptions.  This would go some way to 
ameliorating many of the issues that arise under the 2010 Act as currently drafted. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
104; Newgate Stud Co v Penfold [2004] EWHC 2993 (Ch); Paragon Finance plc v DB 
Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 (CA); Peconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok 
Fai (2009) 12 HKCFAR 139; and Paki v Attorney-General [2009] 1 NZLR 72 (HC).  
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II THE LIMITATION ACT 2010 
 The 2010 Act replaced the 1950 Act,3 which was based on a 1936 Report of the 
English Law Revision Committee4 and the resulting Limitation Act 1939 (UK).5  New 
Zealand's Attorney-General, presiding over the Limitation Act reform in 2009, 
adopted Prime and Scanlan's description of the United Kingdom limitation rules as a 
"ghastly network of unreformed legal fossils … impervious to natural understanding 
and intelligence".6  And of the 1950 Act, the Attorney-General was similarly scathing: 
"The 1950 Act is creaky and outmoded. It is fair to say that it is in an advanced state 
of legislative putrefaction."7  The aim of the 2010 Act was, then, to address a 
multitude of concerns with the 1950 legislation "by both improving and simplifying 
the general limitation rules".8   
 
 The enacting of the 2010 Act concluded a long stretch during which the 1950 
Act was under review.  The Law Commission first recommended that the 1950 Act 
"be repealed and replaced with a new statute" in 1988.9  This Report, while 
advocating a complete overhaul, was very much focused on the issues surrounding 
latent defects.  Indeed, in its Preliminary Paper, the Commission noted that the 
Minister of Justice, in requesting the Commission to examine the 1950 Act,  "made 
specific reference to … liability for latent defects … but saw no great merit in 
examining only one aspect rather than the whole of the 1950 Act".10  Consequently, 
examination of issues relating to latent defects was front and centre in both the 
Preliminary Paper,11 and the Report.12  The Commission's recommendations in the 
1988 Report were not acted upon at the time, and in 2000, the Law Commission 
                                                 
3 However, the Limitation Act 1950 continues to apply to most actions based on acts or 
omissions before 1 January 2011: Limitation Act 2010, s 59. 
4 Wright Committee Statutes of Limitation (English Law Reform Committee, Cmnd 5334, 
1936). 
5 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1) (explanatory note) at 1–2. 
6 (24 August 2010) 666 NZPD 13557 per Christopher Finlayson, referring to comments made 
by Terry Prime and Gary Scanlan "Fiduciaries and Limitation, the Courts and the Law 
Commission" (2009) 30 Stat LR 140 at 144 
7 (4 August 2009) 656 NZPD 5379 per Christopher Finlayson. 
8 (4 August 2009) 656 NZPD 5379 per Christopher Finlayson. 
9 Law Commission Limitation Defences in Civil Proceedings (NZLC R6, 1988) [Limitation 
Defences in Civil Proceedings], following a Preliminary Paper: Law Commission The 
Limitation Act 1950: A Discussion Paper (NZLC PP3, 1987) [Preliminary Paper]. 
10 At [2]. 
11 See chs 5 and 6.  
12 Chapter 4. 
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issued a further Report.  This Report was far more directed, the Commission 
recognising that as a result of the "root and branch approach [of the 1988 Report] 
having found no favour, we have in this report confined our recommendations to 
urgently needed changes".13  These changes revolved around discoverability, again in 
respect of latent defects, and also concerning claims relating to sexual abuse against 
children.14  Little attention was paid in either report to the way in which the 1950 Act 
dealt with issues relating to trusts.  The 1988 Report proposed a general limitation 
period of three years for general civil claims,15 which would include trust claims.16  In 
terms of the exceptions for claims relating to fraudulent breaches of trust, and for 
possession and conversion of trust property under s 21(1) of the 1950 Act, the Report 
simply noted, "the policy underlying s 21(1) … should be continued".17  The second 
Report did not deal with trusts at all. 
 
 After over 20 years under review, Christopher Finlayson MP, then in 
opposition, drafted a Private Member's Bill on limitation,18 after which the Law 
Commission released a Miscellaneous Paper in which its prior reports were 
summarised.19  The draft Bill was published in December 2007, after which the Law 
Commission convened a working group to review the Bill and certain technical issues 
that had been identified.20  Finally, upon becoming Attorney-General in 2008, 
Finlayson introduced as a Government Bill, the Limitation Bill 2009 (the Bill).21  
 
 As is the case with any limitation statute, the resulting 2010 Act sought 
primarily to balance the claimant's right to justice and the defendant's right not to be 
                                                 
13 Law Commission Tidying the Limitation Act (NZLC R61, 2000) [Tidying the Limitation 
Act] at [2]. 
14 See at [8]–[14], [22] and [28]. 
15 Limitation Defences in Civil Proceedings, above n 9, at [128]. 
16 At [305]. 
17 At [306].  Section 21(1) is detailed in Part III:A below. 
18 Letter from Christopher Finlayson (Member of Parliament) to Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
(President of the Law Commission) regarding first draft of Limitation Bill, with the Bill 
appended (1 December 2006) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the 
New Zealand Law Commission). 
19 Law Commission Limitation Defences in Civil Cases: Update Report for the Law 
Commission (Miscellaneous Paper prepared by Chris Corry, Barrister) (NZLC MP16, 2007) 
[Miscellaneous Paper]. 
20 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1) (explanatory note) at 2. 
21 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1).  On the lead up to the introduction of the Bill, see further Chris 
Finlayson "A Foreward From the Attorney-General" in Peter McKenzie and Paul Radich 
"Limitation – the new regime" (New Zealand Law Society seminar, October 2010) 1. 
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burdened by stale claims.22 More specifically, however, the Act sought to address 
three key issues arising out of the earlier Act.23  First, the limitation rules were 
simplified through provision of a general limitation defence for "money claims", 
which covers any claim for monetary relief.24  Certain specific claims falling outside 
the definition of "money claims" were dealt with in pt 3 of the Act.  Secondly, the Act 
was designed to clarify the starting date of the primary limitation period; generally, 
the date of the act or omission giving rise to the claim.25  Thirdly, the Act introduced a 
"late knowledge period".26  The purpose of the late knowledge period, in conjunction 
with provision of longstop periods, was to address difficulties arising in situations 
where the limitation period could end before the potential claimant knew enough to 
encourage them to bring their claim. 
  
 The Act also makes provision for certain claims to which it would be 
inappropriate to apply a strict limitation period: claims for abuse of a minor, or claims 
for personal injury caused by gradual process, disease or infection.27  Certain 
enforcement claims also fall within this category: a claim to enforce judgment by 
action,28 a claim to enforce an arbitral award by action or entry of judgment,29 and an 
ancillary claim.30  In these situations, the court is afforded discretion to grant relief as 
if no statutory limitation period applied.31   
 
 The 2010 Act was therefore focused primarily upon addressing the issues 
identified in the Law Commission reports.  For instance, clarification of the starting 
date of the primary period was designed to address the uncertainty engendered, 
                                                 
22 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1) (explanatory note) at 3. 
23 See generally (4 August 2009) 656 NZPD 5379 per Christopher Finlayson; Letter from 
Sarah Lynn (Ministry of Justice for the Secretary of Justice) to Chester Borrows (Chairperson 
of the Justice and Electoral Committee) regarding the Limitation Bill 2009 Initial Briefing (8 
September 2009) at 1; and Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1) (explanatory note) at 3–4. 
24 Limitation Act 2010, s 4 definition of "money claim" and ss 12 and 48.  See (4 August 
2009) 656 NZPD 5379 per Christopher Finlayson.  Different rules apply in respect of some pt 
3 claims, for example, claims in respect of land held on trust (s 24), claims to recover 
personal property held on trust (s 31), and claims for account (s 32). See further McKenzie 
and Radich, above n 33, at 20 and 41–46.   
25 Limitation Act 2010, s 4 definition of "primary period" and s 11(1).   
26 Limitation Act 2010, s 4 definition of "late knowledge period" and s 11(3)(a). 
27 Limitation Act 2010, s 17. 
28 Section 35. 
29 Section 36. 
30 Section 50. 
31 Sections 17(6), 35(5), 36(4) and 50(3). 
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especially in tort claims, by the 1950 Act's reference to "the date on which the cause 
of action accrued",32 it not being clear whether the date ran from when the act or 
omission occurred, or from the point at which the (often latent) damage was 
incurred.33  Similarly, both the late knowledge period and specific instances of 
discretion afforded to the court were designed to ameliorate the unfairness to 
plaintiffs in situations where the plaintiff did not know they had a claim within the 
primary limitation period, or were labouring under a "disability" as a result of the 
conduct giving rise to the claim, thus preventing them from making reasonable 
judgements in respect of that claim.34  The focus of the legislative reforms is therefore 
clear, and, as in the Law Commission reports, issues relating to trusts were very much 
overlooked.   
 
The following part reviews the way in which each of the 1950 and 2010 Acts 
operate in respect of trusts, highlighting the fact that the approaches are not 
significantly different, but that the drafting changes that have been made in the 2010 
Act have the effect of compounding, rather than addressing, the historic issues. 
 
 
III NEW ZEALAND LIMITATION LEGISLATION AND TRUST CLAIMS 
A The Limitation Act 1950 
 Section 21(1) of the 1950 Act provided: 
(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a 
beneficiary under a trust, being an action– 
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee 
was party or privy; or 
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the 
possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and 
converted to his use. 
                                                 
32 Limitation Act 1950, s 4(1).   
33 Peter McKenzie and Paul Radich "Limitation – the new regime" (New Zealand Law 
Society seminar, October 2010) at 6. 
34 See Andrew Beck "Litigation: The New Law of Limitation" [2010] NZLJ 337 at 338; 
Christopher Finlayson "Limitation Bill passed" (press release, 26 August 2010); and 
McKenzie and Radich, above n 33, at 32–33 and 35. 
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All other actions for breaches of trust, or the recovery of trust property, were 
subject to a six-year limitation period.35  Breaches subject to the limitation period 
were those involving a "technical or legal wrong", but where the trustee "had done 
nothing morally wrong"36 such as the conduct in Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew, where a solicitor's provision of incorrect information to a client was held to 
be "unconscious", and not "dishonest" or "intentional".37  By contrast, the exceptions 
prevented the limitation period running in respect of a "dishonest breach of trust", 
arising in circumstances in which the trustee "acts in a way which he does not 
honestly believe is in" the beneficiary's interests,38 and situations where the trustee 
would come away with the trust property or its proceeds, which "he or she ought not 
to have".39   
 
Therefore, there are three ways in which limitation periods affected actions 
arising out of the beneficiary–trustee relationship, each with discrete policy 
justifications.  First, where the beneficiary's action was to recover from the trustee 
trust property or its proceeds possessed by the trustee, or previously received by the 
trustee and converted to the trustee's use, no limitation period applied per s 21(1)(b).  
This was explicable on the basis of the nature of the action.  Although the trust assets 
were legally vested in the trustee, the beneficiary was beneficial entitled to them.  
Therefore, as Swaddling has explained, "the beneficiary in such a case … does not 
allege a wrong, but simply asks that a certain thing be declared to have belonged to 
the beneficiary".40  Secondly, where the beneficiary's action was based on "fraud or 
fraudulent breach of trust" under s 21(1)(a), again no statutory limitation applied.  
This was because the fiduciary position occupied by the trustee vis-à-vis the 
beneficiary justified a strict rule that the dishonest trustee not be allowed to benefit 
                                                 
35 Limitation Act 1950, s 21(2). 
36 Andrew S Butler and James Every-Palmer "Equitable Defences" in Andrew S Butler (ed) 
Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2009) 1039 at 
[38.1.2(3)]. 
37 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 15 and 19. 
38 Armitage v Nurse, above n 2, at 251 and 261.  
39 Butler and Every-Palmer, above n 36, at [38.1.2(3)], citing In re Timmis [1900] 1 Ch 176 
and Thorne v Heard [1895] AC 495 (HL). 
40 William Swaddling "Limitation" in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds) Breach of Trust 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 319 at 321.  See also Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, 
above n 1, at [13] per Lord Sumption. 
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from his or her fraudulent conduct.41  The residual category – actions by a beneficiary 
against trustees not falling within either of the two exceptions above – was subject to 
a six-year statutory limitation period on the basis that "the honest trustee [should be 
treated] as any other businessman".42  
 
Although no statutory limitation period applied in respect of the exceptions 
under the 1950 Act, the equitable doctrine of laches would apply to protect prejudiced 
defendants, where appropriate.43  The doctrine operates against a claimant by 
allowing a defendant a defence where there has been unreasonable delay in the 
claimant's assertion of his or her rights.44  There is no fixed point, under the doctrine, 
by which time a claim will be barred.  Rather, the doctrine of laches is discretionary, 
and the court will consider the circumstances of each case, making "an assessment of 
where the balance of justice lies".45   
 
The doctrine did not, however, apply in respect of proprietary claims under the 
1950 Act.  The policy justification for this was the same as that which justified the s 
21(1)(b) exception: that the trustee's possession of the property is, at all times, in 
effect the possession of the beneficiary.46  As noted by Sir John Romilly MR:47  
Lapse of time [laches] and acquiescence apply to cases where [trust property] is 
parted with or becomes deficient, and where you seek to make a trustee answerable or 
liable to pay something by reason of his conduct … But [the fund subject to this 
claim] is the property of the [beneficiary].     
                                                 
41 This policy justification is explored in more depth below in Part IV:A:1. 
42 Donovan WM Waters Law of Trusts in Canada (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Toronto, 1984) 
at 1016. 
43 Geraint Thomas and Alastair Hudson (eds) The Law of Trusts (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010) at [32.99] citing Nelson v Rye [1996] 1 WLR 1378; and Gary Watt 
"Laches, estoppel and election" in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds) Breach of Trust (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 353.  See, in respect of the New Zealand 1950 Act specifically, 
Preliminary Paper, above n 9, at [25].  Note however Mummery LJ's approach to the 
application of the doctrine of laches in Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3), 
above n 2, at [140].  Mummery LJ's contrary approach to the equivalent provision in the 
Limitation Act 1980 (UK) is critiqued in Gary Scanlan "The DEG case: the final chapter – the 
need for a consistent limitation regime" (2006) 27 Co Law 186. 
44 Butler and Every-Palmer, above n 36, at [38.1.4(1)]. 
45 Butler and Every-Palmer, above n 36, at [38.1.4(4)].  See also Preliminary Paper, above n 
9, at [26]–[27].   
46 As Lord Sumption explains it in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, above n 1, at [13]. 
47 Mills v Drewitt (1855) 52 ER 748 at 750, cited in Swaddling, above n 40, at 322. 
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As such, the doctrine of laches only applied to actions arising out of fraud or 
fraudulent breaches of trust. 
 
B The Limitation Act 2010 
The wording used in s 21 of the 1950 Act has caused significant issues across 
numerous jurisdictions in which similar wording is used.  As Prime and Scanlan note 
in respect of the 1950 Act's equivalent in the United Kingdom:48 
The law … is regrettably both unclear and complex and offers no encouragement 
to those of us who believe that modern law should be rational, principled, and 
within the capacity of the diligent and reasonably intelligent layman to understand.   
These issues include, among others: whether the law applies to constructive trusts 
generally, or only constructive trusts pre-existing the impugned transaction;49 whether 
the standard of fraud for a fraudulent breach of trust is actual or equitable fraud;50 and 
whether the doctrine of laches does in fact apply to fraudulent breaches of trust.51  
Despite such scathing indictments as that of Prime and Scanlan, the lack of attention 
paid to such issues in the reform process saw the drafters of 2010 Act adopt, in many 
respects, a materially similar approach, notwithstanding some differences in the 
structure of drafting. 
 
The three ways in which limitation periods may affect actions arising out of 
the beneficiary–trustee relationship, identified in the previous sub-part, remain the 
same regardless of differences in the structure of drafting.  Trust claims not falling 
within the fraudulent breach of trust, or possession and conversion exceptions, will be 
subject to the standard six year limitation period.  However, the start date will differ 
depending on whether the claim is a personal or proprietary claim. If the claim is a 
personal claim for equitable compensation, the claim will be dealt with as a money 
claim under s 11 and the start date will be the date on which the act or omission 
giving rise to the claim, occurred.  If the claim is an equitable proprietary claim, the 
                                                 
48 Prime and Scanlan, above n 6, at 142 discussing s 21 of the Limitation Act 1980 (UK). 
49 See for recent examples Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, above n 1; Paragon Finance 
plc v DB Thakerar & Co, above n 2; Peconic Industrial Development Ltd v Lau Kwok Fai, 
above n 2; and Paki v Attorney-General, above n 2. 
50 See Armitage v Nurse, above n 2.  Compare with the discussion in Butler and Every-
Palmer, above n 36, at [38.1.2(3)(c)]. 
51 See Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3), above n 2, at [140], critiqued in 
Scanlan, above n 43. 
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relevant pt 3 period52 and the relevant pt 3 start date will apply.53  The policy 
justification for the six-year period remains the same as under the 1950 Act: the 
honest trustee is to be treated the same as any other defendant. 
 
Section 49 deals with the exception for trust property possessed by the trustee, 
or converted to the trustee's use.  The key difference with the 1950 Act is that a late 
knowledge period is imposed in the 2010 Act.  If the claim is brought three years after 
the beneficiary gained or ought to have gained knowledge of the trustee's breach of 
trust, the claim will be time barred.54  Given the policy informing this exception, the 
appropriateness of the application of a late knowledge period is somewhat open to 
question.  As noted above, the s 21(1)(b) exception in the 1950 Act and the non-
applicability of the doctrine of laches was justified on the basis that the beneficiary's 
entitlement to the property meant that the trustee's possession of that property was 
always considered, in equity, to be the beneficiary's possession.  There is therefore a 
logical difficulty in imposing any limitation period in respect of such a claim.55  On 
the other hand, it is not clear whether that policy justification is the best way of 
explaining the justification.  Indeed, Swaddling refers to it as "obscure",56 and it begs 
the question whether it is really appropriate that a trustee faces "perpetual liability"57 
in respect of an ownership claim.  The Law Commission of England and Wales, for 
instance, has proposed that the proper balance is achieved by the application of a 
"discovery" principle, which "swallows up" the need to impose indefinite liability in 
achieving fairness to the beneficiary.58  In doing so, the Commission ignored the 
traditional policy justification.  Instead, it explained the policy underlying the 
exception for such claims, as a variation of that applying to fraudulent breaches of 
trust: "that the trustee bears a special responsibility to the beneficiaries of his or her 
                                                 
52 On Part 3 periods see above n 24. 
53 See for example s 31 dealing with claims to recover personal property held on trust.  See 
generally JC Corry Limitation Act Handbook (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) at [O.14]. 
54 Such a claim may arise, for example, out of a breach of the "self-dealing rule": see John 
Mowbray and others Lewin on Trusts (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) at [44-12] 
and [20-63]–[20-64]. 
55 See Corry, above n 53, at [49.1]. 
56 Swaddling, above n 40, at 321. 
57 Adopting the phrase used in David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles Mitchell Underhill 
and Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees (17th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, London, 
2006) at 1128. 
58 Law Commission of England and Wales Limitation of Actions: Consultation Paper (EWLC 
CP151, 1998) at [13.99]–[13.108]. 
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trust, and that it would be wrong to allow the trustee to benefit from the property 
which he or she holds for others".59 It would seem that by introducing a late 
knowledge period to claims in respect of trust property, the drafters of the New 
Zealand 2010 Act have taken the same approach. 
 
In respect of fraudulent breaches of trust, the 2010 Act defines "fraud" as 
including "fraudulent breach of trust", and leaves such breaches to be dealt with by s 
48, the general fraud provision.  Relevantly, s 48(1) provides:  
A claim's longstop period or Part 3 period does not apply to the claim if the 
claimant proves that, because of the fraud by or on behalf of the defendant, at 
the close of the start date of that period, the claimant neither knew nor 
reasonably ought to have known all or any of [the facts listed in paragraphs (a)–
(e) of subs (1)]. 
While s 48 provides an exception for claims arising out of fraudulent breaches of 
trust, it imposes a number of requirements that must be met in order to prevent the 
defendant relying on the relevant statutory limitation period; requirements which did 
not exist in respect of fraudulent breaches of trust under the 1950 Act.   
 
First, a causation requirement is imposed.  The fraudulent breach of trust must 
itself cause the lack of knowledge on the part of the claimant.  By contrast, s 21(1)(a) 
of the 1950 Act merely required that there had been a fraudulent breach of trust.  
Secondly, fraudulent breaches of trust became subject to a "late knowledge period".60  
Where a claimant, prevented from knowing of the facts giving rise to a claim because 
of the fraudulent breach of trust, eventually gains knowledge, the relevant Part 3 
period, or longstop period, is disapplied,61 and instead the late knowledge period62 
will apply.  From this point the claimant has three years to bring the claim.63  No such 
statutory late knowledge period began to run in respect of fraudulent breaches of trust 
under the 1950 Act.64 A third requirement was imposed by virtue of the second.  The 
late knowledge period will start to run from the point at which the claimant either 
                                                 
59 Law Commission of England and Wales Limitations of Action (Law Com No 270, 2001). 
60 See s 11 in respect of "money claims" and s 48(3) in respect of Part 3 claims.  
61 Section 48(1). 
62 Per s 11(3) in respect of "money claims" and s 48(3) in respect of Part 3 claims. 
63 Sections 11(3) and 48(3). 
64 See generally on the statutory late knowledge requirement in the 2010 Act, Corry, above n 
53, at [48.2]. 
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"gained" or "ought reasonably to have gained knowledge" of the relevant facts.65  The 
2010 Act therefore imposes a constructive knowledge standard.  The consequence of 
all of this is that the exception for fraudulent breaches of trust applies only where the 
claimant beneficiary's lack of knowledge is caused by the fraudulent conduct, and 
that, once the beneficiary has constructive knowledge of that conduct, a three-year 
limitation period is imposed.   
 
 
IV THE FRAUDULENT BREACH OF TRUST EXCEPTION 
As a means of illustrating the difficulties that arise out of the way in which 
breaches of trust were dealt with by the 2010 Act, the remainder of this paper 
analyses each of the three new requirements applying to the fraudulent breach of trust 
exception.  This assessment is conducted against the background of the general policy 
tensions inherent in all limitation statutes, and the special policy considerations 
arising out of the trustee–beneficiary relationship.  The following sub-part 
recapitulates and expands upon the earlier discussion of the relevant policy 
considerations. 
 
A Policy Considerations 
1 In favour of the exception 
Limitation periods must be drawn so as to ensure justice is done in respect of a 
claim, and often difficulties in gaining the requisite knowledge to bring a claim justify 
certain extensions to the statutory limitation periods.  This is to be balanced against 
the need to protect defendants from indefinite liability.  The broad policy 
underpinning the approach in limitation statutes to breaches of trust was concisely put 
by Kekewich J in Re Timmis:66 
The intention of the statute was to give a trustee the benefit of the lapse of time 
when, although he had done something legally or technically wrong, he had done 
nothing morally wrong or dishonest … 
                                                 
65 Listed in s 48(1). 
66 In re Timmis, above n 39, at 186.  See also Thorne v Heard, above n 39, at 504–505 per 
Lord Macnaghten. 
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It has long been recognised, however, that the statutory limitation period should not 
"permit a trustee to protect fraudulent conduct",67 where "fraudulent conduct" 
amounts to dishonesty.68  This is because of the special fiduciary relationship between 
trustee and beneficiary.  The nature of the relationship is such that the trustee occupies 
a powerful position vis-à-vis the beneficiary.  The Ontario Law Reform Commission 
echoed the same concern: "The very nature of a trust pre-supposes a confidence in the 
trustee."69  The corresponding primary obligation of any trustee is "to preserve and 
promote the interests of the beneficiary".70  Therefore, even though honest breaches of 
trust will be subject to statutory limitation, treating the honest trustee "as any other 
businessman",71 the power exercised by a trustee over the property of another justifies 
precluding the dishonest trustee from benefitting from protection of the ordinary 
statutory limitation period.  
 
2 Against the exception 
 While seeking to protect the right of the claimant to achieve justice, limitation 
statutes equally aim to protect defendants from having to defend stale claims. This 
latter consideration is strongly in favour of setting clear, relatively constrained 
limitation periods.  The sentiment of the policy was well expressed by David Parker 
in the first reading of the Bill:  "People do make mistakes in life and they have 
consequences, but those consequences ought not to be held above someone’s neck 
forever like the sword of Damocles."72  This, however, is only one of three 
justifications for the imposition of limitation periods.  Limitation periods are also 
important because they mitigate the difficulties of proving a claim as time passes, 
documentary evidence is destroyed and witnesses' memories become hazy.  They also 
encourage claimants to act promptly in enforcing their rights.73   
 
                                                 
67 Butler and Every-Palmer, above n 36, at [38.1.2(3)]. 
68 Armitage v Nurse, above n 2, at 261.  
69 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Limitation of Actions (1969) at 60.  This 
statement was cited with approval in Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report 
on Limitations (Report No 6, 1974) at 50. 
70 See Armitage v Nurse, above n 2, at 251; and Swaddling, above n 40, at 337 citing Speight 
v Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1 (HL) and Learoyd v Whiteley (1887) 12 App Cas 727 (HL). 
71 Waters, above n 42, at 1016. 
72 (4 August 2009) 656 NZPD 5379 per David Parker. 
73 See generally A McGee Limitation Periods (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, London, 2010) at 
[1.035]. 
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 The question of justification for the exception must also be posed in the context 
of the benefits to be gained from certainty and simplicity in a limitation statute.  The 
statute ought to be clear, predictable and fair.  An unduly complex statute can lack 
coherence.  Worse, it "can present a trap for the unwary and renders the law largely 
unintelligible to lay people".74  So, although there may be special cases that 
necessitate deviation from the general limitation regime in the interests of fairness, 
these should minimised and explicitly stated.75 
 
 This then begs the question whether fraudulent conduct by trustees justifies 
either a broad exception from the statutory limitation period, or, in the case of the 
2010 Act, a looser standard than that which presently applies in respect of other 
fraudulent conduct.  Various jurisdictions have taken different approaches to this 
question.  For example, New South Wales imposes a 12-year limitation period (as 
opposed to the standard six years) where the claim is based on fraudulent breach of 
trust.76 By contrast, the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended a limitation 
period of three years running from the point at which the beneficiary "becomes fully 
aware" of the breach.77  Differently again, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales proposed that its standard recommended primary limitation period should 
apply to fraudulent breaches of trust, subject to the general exception for fraudulent 
concealment.78  There seems to be agreement, at least amongst law reform agencies, 
that in the case of fraudulent breaches of trust, once the beneficiary is aware that they 
have a claim against the trustee, there is no reason why that beneficiary should not be 
required to bring that claim promptly.  The differences occur around the edges on 
questions of: whether there should be an ultimate limitation period regardless of 
knowledge; whether there must be actual or constructive knowledge; and whether 
                                                 
74 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 58, at [1.2]. 
75 See the discussion in Miscellaneous Paper, above n 19, at [3]–[5]. 
76 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s 47.  As recommended by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission Report of the Law Reform Commission Being the First Report on the Limitation 
of Actions (LRC3, October 1967) at [230]. 
77 Ontario Law Reform Commission, above n 69, at 60.  The same recommendation was 
made by the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, above n 69, at 50–51, and was 
enacted in s 6(1) of the Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266.  Saskatchewan has also adopted 
this approach: The Limitations Act, SS 2004, c L-16.1, s 12. 
78 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 59, at [4.95]–[4.101].  The Commission's 
recommendations were initially accepted in principle, however the government subsequently 
opted not to take the reforms forward: see Law Commission of England and Wales 
"Limitation of Actions" <www.lawcommission.justice.gov.uk>. 
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there must fraudulent concealment of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.  
These are the same issues that are at stake in New Zealand's approach under the 2010 
Act. 
 
B Assessing the Approach in the 2010 Act 
The following sections consider each of the three new requirements imposed 
by the 2010 Act on a claimant beneficiary for claims arising out of fraudulent 
breaches of trust.  It is first interesting to note, however, the paucity of explanation in 
the parliamentary materials as to why the changes to the exception were made.  This 
lack of explanation gives credence to one of the central propositions in this paper: that 
issues arising in respect of trusts were neglected in the drafting and design of the 2010 
Act. 
 
The explanatory note to the Bill explains that ss 21(1)(a) and s 2879 of the 
1950 Act "provide for exceptions or modifications to limitation periods in cases of 
fraud".80  It then continues, noting:81 
The current law (sections 21(1)(a) and 28 of the 1950 Act) provides for 
exceptions or modifications to limitation periods in cases of fraud. Clause 46 
[of the Bill] similarly ensures that a claim's longstop period or Part 3 period 
does not apply if, because of the fraud by or on behalf of the defendant, at the 
close of the start date of that period the claimant neither knew nor ought 
reasonably to have known all or any of specified key facts that the claimant 
must know in order to make the claim. 
This then represents that s 21(1)(a) of the 1950 Act imposed a causation requirement.  
As already noted, this is incorrect.  The exception in s 21(1)(a) exists simply by virtue 
of the fraudulent conduct.  Therefore, the explanatory note fails to recognise the 
substantial changes being introduced in respect of fraudulent breaches of trust.   
 
The Departmental Report from the Ministry of Justice, in response to a 
submission advocating for the retention of s 21(1)(a) in the same terms as in the 1950 
                                                 
79 The general fraud provision under the 1950 Act: "Postponement of limitation period in case 
of fraud or mistake". 
80 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1) (explanatory note) at 14. 
81 At 14 (emphasis added). 
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Act,82 acknowledges that there is a change in the law from the position under the 1950 
Act insofar as the late knowledge period will apply.  The Report notes that as "[m]any 
trusts … last for decades … defendants would otherwise face indefinite liability".83  
This singular statement, representing only one side of the inherent policy tension in 
limitation statutes – to balance the claimant's right to justice and the defendant's right 
not to be burdened by stale claims – is the sole justification in any of the publically 
available parliamentary materials given for the changes to the fraudulent breach of 
trust exception.  The Report makes no recognition of the causation requirement 
imposed in s 48.   
 
 There is therefore little indication as to exactly why a broad exception for 
fraudulent breaches of trust was not carried over into the 2010 Act.  The only 
explanation is that the general fraud exception was seen as sufficiently wide, albeit 
this stated with no apparent analysis.84  
 
1 Causation 
 As noted earlier, the 2010 Act imposes a causation requirement.  Rather than 
the exception operating in respect of the mere existence of a fraudulent breach of trust 
as in the 1950 Act, the 2010 Act requires the claimant beneficiary to establish that his 
or her lack of knowledge was "because of" the fraudulent breach of trust.  As Corry 
has explained, the justification is that the defendant trustee "will generally have 
operated secretly from the claimant" and that "[u]ntil the secrecy is exposed or the 
claimant becomes aware of the breach of trust the claimant is in no position to make a 
claim."85  However, in many cases, whether or not the trustee has acted secretly will 
be immaterial to the fraudulent act on which the beneficiary's claim is based.  As 
noted by the Law Commission in its review of the law of trusts in New Zealand, there 
                                                 
82 See James Macfarlane "Supplementary Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee 
on the Limitation Bill 2009" (16 September 2009). 
83 Ministry Of Justice Limitation Bill: Departmental Report (October 2009) at 30.   
84 See Peter Blanchard "Limitation Bill: Note for Meeting on Monday 25 August 2008" 
(obtained under Official Information Act 1982 request to the New Zealand Law Commission) 
at [9].  See also Beck, above n 34, at 340. 
85 Corry, above n 53, at [48.6]. 
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are sound reasons why a trustee may not keep a beneficiary informed in the ordinary 
course, or even why a trustee may legitimately operate "secretly":86 
A settlor may, for good reasons, wish to ensure that certain kinds of information 
are not disclosed to certain beneficiaries.  It is also possible that disclosure of 
information that may seem uncontroversial may nevertheless damage the interests 
of someone who is neither settlor, nor trustee, nor beneficiary.  Disclosing certain 
information to a beneficiary might give the beneficiary a commercial advantage 
that he or she would not otherwise have; for example, access to information that is 
commercially valuable to the beneficiary in a different capacity. 
This emphasises the "special degree" of reliance or confidence the beneficiary has in 
the trustee, and it is this reliance that will in many cases cause the beneficiary's lack 
of knowledge, rather than the fraudulent conduct itself. 
 
 Thus, at the very least, this causation requirement misrepresents the policy 
justifications for the exception.  By definition, the beneficiary reposes trust and 
confidence in the trustee to manage the beneficiary's property in the beneficiary's best 
interests, and it is the failure to honestly act in what the trustee considers the 
beneficiary's best interests that gives rise to a fraudulent breach of trust.87  The 
beneficiary is not required to exercise any oversight in respect of the trustee's actions.  
Indeed, as highlighted above, in some circumstances the whole reason the settlor has 
used the trust vehicle is so that they cannot.  So, to say that the fraudulent breach of 
trust must have caused the lack of knowledge is illogical in achieving the policy 
behind the exception.  It is the very fact of the fraudulent conduct in the context of the 
trustee–beneficiary relationship that justifies the exception.  Consequently, there is a 
clear risk that some cases that might otherwise have been deemed appropriately to fall 
within the fraudulent breach of trust exception from a policy perspective, may fail to 
meet the causation requirement imposed by the 2010 Act.  The following example 
illustrates the way in which such a situation may occur.   
 
John and Jane's marriage ends.  As part of the divorce arrangements, two 
discretionary trusts are created for the benefit of the child of the marriage, Thomas.  
John is trustee and beneficiary of one (Trust 1), and Jane is trustee and beneficiary of 
                                                 
86 Law Commission The Duties, Office and Powers of a Trustee: Review of the Law of Trusts 
Fourth Issues Paper (NZLC IP26, 2011) at [2.2]. 
87 Armitage v Nurse, above n 2, at 251 and 261. 
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the other (Trust 2).  Thomas is a beneficiary of both.  The trust deed of Trust 1 
provides that the trust fund and net income of the trust should provide for the private 
secondary school education of Thomas.  The trust deed of the Trust 2 provides that 
the trust fund and net income of the trust should provide for any tertiary education 
Thomas chooses to undertake, and for the general welfare of Thomas.  The funds in 
Trust 1 are applied consistent with the requirements of the trust deed.  Additionally, 
Jane periodically exercises discretion in favour of Thomas when required to fulfil the 
relevant welfare obligations of Trust 2.  However, Thomas, upon graduating from 
secondary school, decides to travel and spends the next 10 years travelling and 
working in Europe.  The same year as Thomas leaves, Jane's business faces financial 
trouble, and she uses most of the funds from Trust 2 to invest in the business, 
knowing it to be unlikely to net a favourable return, and therefore contrary to the 
interests of Thomas.  The business folds shortly afterwards, and Trust 2's investment 
is lost.  Despite Jane's dishonest conduct on the investment front, the investment is 
recorded in the trust accounts.  Thomas was entitled to view these accounts at any 
time.  Upon returning, almost a decade after the Trust's investment was lost, Thomas 
decides to study at university.  However, it transpires that, as a result of the bad 
investment, there are insufficient funds to pay for his tertiary education.  Under the 
1950 Act, Thomas would be able to claim against Jane for equitable compensation 
arising out of her fraudulent breach of trust.  Under the 2010 Act, however, Thomas's 
claim would be time barred because his lack of knowledge was not because of Jane's 
fraudulent breach of trust, but merely as a result of the confidence Thomas reposed, 
and was entitled to repose, in Jane. 
 
 The example makes it clear that the exception is drawn too narrowly in the 
2010 Act.  This will have the effect of frustrating the policy behind having such an 
exception in the first place; it risks allowing a trustee to protect its fraudulent conduct 
where the trustee does not actively conceal that conduct.  More than that, it actually 
encourages dishonest trustees to take a risk and engage in fraudulent conduct openly, 
in full knowledge that when the beneficiary gains knowledge of the fraudulent 
conduct their claim may well be statute-barred.  This is manifestly inconsistent with 
one of the stated aims of the 2010 Act, the late knowledge period having been 
introduced with the general purpose of addressing difficulties arising in situations 
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where the limitation period could end before the potential claimant knew enough to 
encourage them to bring their claim. 
 
2 Late knowledge 
While the general purpose of the late knowledge period was to ameliorate the 
issue of a claim becoming barred before a claimant knew enough to pursue it, its 
effect on beneficiaries who are victims of fraudulent conduct by their trustees is 
actually to introduce a condition.  It requires that, upon gaining knowledge of certain 
specified facts giving rise to a claim, the beneficiary is required to bring the claim 
within three years.  This section first considers the desirability of this statutory late 
knowledge period under the 2010 Act by contrast with the doctrine of laches, which 
operated to ameliorate indefinite liability under the 1950 Act.  Secondly, an anomaly 
arising out of the 2010 Act's treatment of beneficiaries under discretionary trusts is 
flagged as it risks undermining the effectiveness of the policy underlying the 
imposition of the late knowledge period. 
 
As with the doctrine of laches, the late knowledge period operates to prevent 
prejudice to defendants in situations where the claimant knew of the facts giving rise 
to the cause of action, but did not bring the claim within a reasonable time.  The late 
knowledge period is capable of acknowledging that there may be good reason why 
time should not run as it would ordinarily.  Indeed, as noted earlier, this is a core 
feature of the 2010 Act.  Equally the late knowledge period provides that once that 
knowledge is acquired, the claimant should be compelled to bring the claim with due 
haste.   
 
The late knowledge period is arguably preferable to the doctrine of laches.  
Whereas the doctrine of laches is uncertain because of its discretionary nature, both 
claimants and defendants benefit, under the late knowledge period, from the 
imposition of a fixed period of time in which the claimant must bring the claim.88  It 
is true that establishing the date at which the claimant acquired the requisite 
knowledge may be difficult to determine, but the three-year late knowledge period 
still provides a much more accurate yardstick than the equitable doctrine. 
                                                 
88 See Gary Scanlan "Limitation periods and actions against company directors" (2004) 25 Co 
Law 175 at 180. 
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Therefore, because the doctrine of laches applied to claims under the broad 
1950 Act exception, and because practically, the late knowledge period fulfils a 
similar role to the equitable doctrine in the 2010 Act, the imposition of the late 
knowledge period is not problematic.  Indeed, due to the level of certainty established 
in its operation, over and above the doctrine of laches, the statutory late knowledge 
period is arguably to be preferred.89 
 
(a) The discretionary trust anomaly 
The 2010 Act's treatment of discretionary trusts, however, introduces an 
anomaly.90  As noted by the Law Commission in its review of the law of trusts, the 
discretionary trust is the favoured form of express trust in New Zealand.91  Under the 
2010 Act, a claim's start date in respect of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust is 
the moment at which the beneficiary "becomes entitled to trust income or property 
because of the trustees' discretion being exercised in the beneficiary's favour".92  This 
does not preclude the discretionary beneficiary from bringing a claim before that 
discretion is exercised.93  The position of discretionary beneficiaries was not covered 
in the original version of the Bill,94 but was addressed upon the urging of one 
submitter who was concerned that the Bill left the position of discretionary 
beneficiaries unclear.95  In support of the approach now prevailing in the Act, the 
Select Committee noted:96 
A discretionary beneficiary has no interest in the trust until the trustee exercises their 
discretion in favour of the beneficiary. Until this occurs, a beneficiary has no interest 
                                                 
89 See generally Prime and Scanlan, above n 6; Scanlan, above n 88; and Scanlan, above n 43.  
90 Discretionary trusts also caused significant difficulties under the 1950 Act and its 
equivalents in other jurisdictions.  See the discussion in Hayton, Matthews and Mitchell, 
above n 54, at [96.18]–[96.23] and David Hayton, Justice of the Caribbean Court of Justice 
"Some Crucial Aspects of Section 21 Limitation Act 1980" (The ACTAPS Annual Lecture, 
2009), referring to three important cases in this regard: Armitage v Nurse, above n 2; Johns v 
Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 (CA); and Lemos v Coutts (Cayman) Ltd (2006) 9 ITELR 616 
(CA). 
91 Law Commission Review of the Law of Trusts in New Zealand: Introductory Issues Paper 
(NZLC IP19, 2010) at [1.15]. 
92 Limitation Act 2010, s 16(1)(e) in respect of money claims and s 38(1)(b) in respect of Part 
3 claims. 
93 Corry, above n 53, at [16.1.5]. 
94 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-1), cls 15 and 36. 
95 Andrew Butler "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Limitation Bill 
2009" (10 September 2009) at [13]. 
96 Limitation Bill 2009 (33-2) (select committee report) at 6. 
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able to be damaged by a breach of a trust. While a discretionary beneficiary can, at 
any time, compel the proper administration of a trust, time should not run against 
them for a money claim in respect of a discretionary interest until the trustee has 
exercised their discretion in the beneficiary’s favour.  
The effect of this, however, is that while a beneficiary under a fixed trust will be 
subject to the standard limitation period for a breach of trust, or the late knowledge 
period, the discretionary beneficiary who has not had discretion exercised in his or her 
favour, although having full knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim, is not 
bound to bring the claim until that discretion has so been exercised.  This creates a 
significant gulf in the rights of trustees and beneficiaries under a discretionary trust, 
as against those under a fixed trust.  This vastly different treatment raises questions as 
to whether the approach to discretionary beneficiaries under the 2010 Act is 
appropriate, and is another illustration of the lack of consideration given in the 
drafting of the 2010 Act to the way in which trust claims should be dealt with. 
 
A full analysis of the competing policy objectives relating to when time 
should start running in respect of claims by a beneficiary under a discretionary trust is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  It suffices for present purposes to note that the 
difference in treatment between different classes of beneficiary creates an element of 
unfairness in the face of the general aim of statutes of limitation to be clear, 
predictable and fair.  This does not mean that the late knowledge period should not 
apply.  Rather, it strongly supports reconsideration of the treatment of beneficiaries of 
discretionary trusts under the Act. 
 
3 Constructive knowledge 
 The provision for late knowledge periods in the 2010 Act sees the adoption of a 
constructive knowledge standard: the relevant late knowledge period begins to run at 
the point at which the claimant beneficiary gains, or ought to have gained, knowledge 
of certain specified facts.97  The general provision dealing with fraud and mistake 
under the 1950 Act also applied a constructive knowledge standard.98  Under that 
provision, the period of limitation did not begin to run "until the plaintiff … 
                                                 
97 See ss 14(1)(a)–(e) and 48(1)(a)–(e). 
98 Of course, under that Act, the fraudulent breach of trust exception was dealt with 
separately. 
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discovered the fraud … or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it".99  The 
Limitation Act 1980 (UK) has the same requirement.100  In determining the standard 
of constructive knowledge applicable in respect of the general fraud provision in the 
2010 Act, and by extension, now applicable to defrauded beneficiaries, it is therefore 
useful to consider the standard that "reasonable diligence" under the 1950 Act was 
held to represent. 
 
 The meaning of the term "reasonable diligence" in the United Kingdom's 
equivalent general fraud and mistake provision was considered in Peco Arts Inc v 
Hazlitt Gallery Ltd (Peco Arts).101  That case concerned a claim for the return of the 
purchase price of a painting on the basis of mistake of fact when the painting was 
discovered to be a reproduction 12 years after purchase.  In holding that the limitation 
period did not apply, Webster J held that "reasonable diligence [in the context] means 
… the doing of that which an ordinarily prudent buyer and possessor of a valuable 
work of art would do having regard to the circumstances, including the circumstances 
of the purchase".102  Webster J also clarified that "the precise meaning to be given" to 
the phrase "reasonable diligence", "must vary with the particular context in which [the 
phrase is] applied".103  This introduces the elements of "ordinary" or "reasonable" 
prudence in the specific context.  Citing Peco Arts, Halsbury's Laws of England notes 
that:104 
… it must be shown that there has been something to put [the claimant] on inquiry in 
respect of the matter itself and that if inquiry had been made it would have led to the 
discovery of the real facts. 
The Laws of New Zealand notes:105 
The standard of diligence which the defrauded person needs to prove is high.  This is 
so, except where he is entitled to rely on the other person.  In order to prove that a 
person might have discovered a fraud with reasonable diligence at a particular time, 
it is not, it seems, sufficient to show that he might have discovered the fraud by 
                                                 
99 Limitation Act 1950, s 28. 
100 Limitation Act 1980 (UK), s 32(1). 
101 Peco Arts Inc v Hazlitt Gallery Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1315. 
102 At 1323. 
103 At 1322–1323. 
104 Halsbury's Laws of England (5th ed, 2008) vol 68 Limitation Periods at [1223]. 
105 Laws of New Zealand Limitations of Civil Proceedings at [306] referring to Inca Ltd v 
Autoscript (New Zealand) Ltd [1979] 2 NZLR 700 (SC), as cited in Amaltal Corporation v 
Maruha Corporation [2007] 1 NZLR 608 (CA) at [152].   
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pursuing an enquiry in some collateral matter, it must be shown that there has been 
something to put him on enquiry in respect of the matter itself, and that if enquiry 
had been made it would have led to the discovery of the real facts. 
 
 Therefore, a claimant beneficiary must have acted with reasonable prudence in 
the context of the trustee–beneficiary relationship.  Adopting this approach, the 
standard of proof required to establish constructive knowledge on the part of the 
claimant beneficiary should be particularly high.  This is because in this situation, the 
beneficiary "relies on the trustee almost as a friend" and "should not be required to be 
on guard against him".106  In other words, the beneficiary is "entitled to rely" on the 
trustee.107   
 
 In light of the fact that the claimant beneficiary is entitled to, and in certain 
circumstances must, occupy a completely passive role in terms of the trust 
management, the appropriate standard of constructive knowledge would be to require 
wilful blindness on the part of the beneficiary: a very low standard of diligence.  To 
impose any expectation that the beneficiary would undertake any sort of proactive 
inquiry into trustee actions, in principle, would expect too much.  Such considerations 
led the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia to recommend that:108 
Time should not run against a beneficiary with respect to an action … based on any 
fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was party or privy … [U]ntil 
the beneficiary becomes fully aware of the fraud, fraudulent breach of trust, 
conversion or other act of the trustee on which the action would be based, the onus 
of proof of which should rest on the trustee. 
 
 Provided that a very low standard of diligence is required of the claimant 
beneficiary in establishing constructive knowledge, this should suffice, and it would 
be unnecessary to go the step further and adopt the recommendation of the Law 
Reform Commission of British Columbia.  If something alerts even the passive 
beneficiary to fraudulent conduct giving rise to a claim, there is no reason why the 
beneficiary should not then be required to investigate.  Under the 2010 Act, however, 
                                                 
106 Ontario Law Reform Commission, above n 69, at 60, cited in Law Reform Commission of 
British Columbia, above n 69, at 50 
107 Laws of New Zealand, above n 105, at [306]. 
108 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, above n 69, at 50, enacted in s 6(1) of the 
Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266. 
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the exception for fraudulent breaches of trust has been conflated with fraud arising in 
other contexts, such as tort or contract claims where the claimant is not entitled to rely 
on the other party but instead is expected to guard his or her own best interests.  
Under those claims, the defrauded party is expected to prove a high standard of 
diligence,109 and there is a risk that this higher standard of diligence will be applied in 
all situations of fraud, including application to defrauded beneficiaries.  As such, 
although a form of constructive knowledge is appropriate for trust claims based on 
fraudulent conduct, the fraudulent breach of trust exception needs to be disaggregated 
from the general fraud provision to indicate to the courts that a different standard of 
diligence is to be required. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
The rules of limitation relating to breaches of trust and claims in respect of 
trust property are complex and have historically caused substantial difficulties across 
common law jurisdictions.  The Limitation Act 2010 failed to address these issues, 
and in many respects, the drafting in the Act has compounded the problems.  This 
paper has focused particularly on the new difficulties that arise as a result of the way 
in which fraudulent breaches of trust are dealt with under the 2010 Act.  In 
harmonising fraudulent breaches of trust with other fraudulent conduct, certain new 
statutory requirements were imposed upon defrauded beneficiaries: the introduction 
of a late knowledge period, with a constructive knowledge standard, and a causation 
requirement.  Taken together, in light of the relevant policy considerations, it has been 
demonstrated that these new requirements are inappropriate and undesirable.   
 
While the imposition of a late knowledge requirement is unproblematic in 
itself, as it merely replaces the equitable doctrine of laches, there is a risk that the 
higher standard of diligence establishing constructive knowledge required of contract 
and tort claimants will now similarly be required of beneficiaries.  The risk arises out 
of the fact that all fraudulent conduct is lumped together in the 2010 Act.  Further, the 
vastly different treatment accorded to beneficiaries of discretionary trusts compared to 
beneficiaries of fixed trusts, in terms of both the standard limitation period and the 
                                                 
109 Laws of New Zealand, above n 105, at [306]. 
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late knowledge period, calls into question the fairness among beneficiaries achieved 
by the 2010 Act. 
 
Even more concerning is the causation requirement – that the beneficiary's 
lack of knowledge must be as a result of the fraudulent conduct.  As opposed to 
preventing the trustee from protecting fraudulent conduct, the way in which the 
exception operates in the 2010 Act actually encourages trustees to engage in 
fraudulent conduct in the open, which is a risk that trustees may well be prepared to 
take given the lack of attention many beneficiaries practically do, and in many cases 
are entitled to, pay to the management of trust assets.  Given that the very nature of 
the relationship permits, and in some circumstances requires, the beneficiary to 
occupy such a passive role, the limitation period applying to dishonest conduct by the 
trustee should reflect this.   
 
One solution for the specific issues arising out of the fraudulent breach of trust 
exception could be to realign that exception with the exception for actions in respect 
of property possessed by the trustee or converted to the trustee's own use, somewhat 
reflecting the drafting of the 1950 Act.  This would drop the causation requirement 
and separate the constructive knowledge standard applicable to fraudulent breaches of 
trust from that applicable to other civil claims.  This, however, would be a mere 
Band-Aid, insufficient to address the myriad of problems arising in this area. The 
specific example of the way in which fraudulent breaches of trust are dealt with under 
the 2010 Act is illustrative of a more widespread problem searching for a more 
fundamental solution.  While breaches of trust generally are dealt with as one of many 
general civil claims, albeit with its exceptions, the specific policy considerations 
applicable to breaches of trust do not adhere well to such a "one size fits all" 
approach.  Instead, it may be more appropriate to siphon off claims by beneficiaries 
against their trustees into a separate category of vulnerable claimants, in much the 
same way as the 2010 Act has dealt with claims for abuse of a minor.     
 
Whatever the appropriate solution may be, given the very significant 
implications that may arise, the many difficulties surrounding the way in which trust 
claims are dealt with in the 2010 Act need to be addressed before the legislation 
begins to have an undesirable effect in practice. 
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